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Abstract
Quantum Key Distribution is meant to be an ultimate computer security system that will
not need upgrade/overhaul from time to time. QKD allows the generation of long key
length on demand. QKD, coupled with the unconditional secure "one-time pad"
encryption system, will be unbreakable for eavesdropper with infinite resources.
Numerous experimental QKD prototypes have demonstrated that QKD is likely to be a
reality before quantum computer.
One of the steps in a Quantum Key Distribution protocol is to remove the transmission
errors from quantum communication, which typically has a high error rate (one percent
or higher). An interactive error control method is utilized in the reconciliation ofQKD.
This procedure divides transmitted bits into blocks. The size of the block is chosen so
that the chance of having multiple error bits in one block is small. By checking parity and
doing interactive BINARY search when a parity error is found, error bits can be located
and removed. Some error bits escape the detection from the first pass. By repeating this
procedure several times, each time randomly dividing bits into blocks, most error bits can
be detected and removed. Each parity check means loss of one bit. The goal is to
minimize the number of parity checks to locate all (or most) errors and to have a high
reliability that the remaining bits have very small residue error rate.
Brassard and Salvail devised a better error control procedure in 1993. By keeping track
of block parity information from pass to pass, which they called CASCADE, the number
of parity checks per error bit is reduced. They observed no errors left after four passes
from 10 simulation runs. However, they offered upper bound of residue error rate that
was much higher than observed from simulation. Therefore, there is a need to find the
optimal block size and to improve the residue error rate analysis of this procedure.
In this work, improvement in reconciliation procedure is obtained in throughput (i.e. the
number of input bits minus the number of parity checks) and in lower residue error rate.
Throughput is doubled at high input error rate and less throughput gain at low input error
rate. Three most important factors that enhance the system throughput are:
1) Using larger block size to fully utilize the power of CASCADE method.
2) Avoiding any pair of bits to stay in the same block of any later pass, which allows the
use of three passes only (instead of four passes in the BS procedure).
3) Some bits are already known to be lost from the current pass, so I avoid carrying
these bits to the later pass.
The residue error rate at the end of the second pass (and the third pass) for small initial
block size is derived. The residue error rate at the end of the third pass is found much
lower than the upper bound given by the previous workers. This residue error rate is
found to be a function of input size and the block size.
This error control method has many similar features and difficulties to the recent
development of "turbo-code" in the error control-coding field.
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1 Introduction
Computer security is becoming increasingly important in the communication industry.
The consumer confidence toward the system security is essential for the growth of
emerging e-business; financial institutions depend heavily on the security of the
computer; hackers constantly challenge the Internet security. Federal government has
recently mounted efforts to boost computer security. Encryption schemes are the essential
pieces of these efforts. In order to communicate privately, sender and receiver share a
short secret key. Encryption schemes use a one-way function to spread the short key over
a long plaintext. One-way functions make it very hard for eavesdroppers to calculate the
key from plaintext and ciphertext. These schemes rely on the computational complexity
such as factoring of large integers or computing discrete logarithms. As computation
power, computing theory and algorithms improve, the security of some cryptographic
systems will become obsolete, diminish, or need overhaul (e.g., increasing key length or
number of rounds); all can be very costly. Recent overhaul from Digital Encryption
Standard (DES) to Advance Encryption Standard (AES) is one example [AES].
"One-time pad"is an unconditionally secure encryption scheme that does not rely on
assumptions of computational complexity. The key length in a one-time pad has to be the
same length as the plaintext, converting the security problem to a key distribution
problem.
Except one-time pad, all encryption systems of today will be at risk by the development
of quantum computer. Shor's algorithm [S94] of factoring large integers in polynomial
time caught much attention as people's fortune may be significantly altered due to
computer security. This finding leads to numerous daunting researches toward the long-
term goal of a quantum computer. Yet an implementation of a quantum computer may
have a disastrous effect on the current security and economic systems.
Quantum encryption may be the best defense against eavesdroppers with supreme
technologies and vast resources (i.e. quantum computers). Should quantum computers
prove impossible to build, QKD still offer a cryptographic system that will not need
system overhaul from decade to decade. (Such as AES or lengthening the key of RSA).
A quantum encryption takes advantage of the fact that eavesdropping activities will lead
to disturbance to the transmitted signals that can be detected by the sender and receiver.
This branch of activity lead to the development of the quantum encryption protocol and
the quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. The latter already has some small-scale
experiment demonstrations, and is the topic of this research study.
1.1 Quantum Key Distribution
QKD system employs two communication channels (Fig. 1): a one-way quantum channel
between the sender (Alice) and the receiver (Bob) and a classical two-way
communication channel. The quantum channel is where the security of the system lies. In
the case of BB84 QKD protocol (more about that in section 1.3), two sets of bases are
used in the quantum channel. The transmission is meaningful only when Alice and Bob
choose the same bases. The key is sent from Alice to Bob in the quantum channel as
quantum states. Eve may eavesdrop in the quantum channel. To counter the
eavesdropping, Alice randomly chooses quantum bases to encode each key bit as
quantum states. Bob measures the quantum signals in either one of the two bases by his
independent random choice. Eve has to guess which bases Alice used and her on-line
measurement will irreversibly disturb -50% of the quantum states she chooses to
measure. This disturbance introduces ~25% errors to the later measurements by the
receiver. Alice and Bob use the classic communication channel to handle various
administrative details, including finding out which quantum signals are sent and
measured in the same bases, detection of errors caused by eavesdropper and removal of
errors from the quantum transmission. The underlying physics that reveals eavesdropping
activity, eavesdropping strategies, and counter strategies can be found in numerous
literature (see Rieffel and Polak [RP] and Lomonaco [L99], the latter is a good and easy
introduction).
The communication between Alice and Bob in the classical channel, encrypted or not, is
totally open to Eve, as Eve is allowed to have superior technologies and unlimited
resources. Eve cannot be allowed to alter the communication in the classical channel,
though. To avoid impersonation by Eve, an unconditionally secure authentication scheme
is needed in the classic channel and Alice and Bob need to share a short secret key for
authentication purposes. Thus, QKD is actually a key expansion scheme. This is a
generic limitation as it is proven impossible to generate an unconditionally secure key
without prior shared secret key. An efficient authentication algorithm is provided by
Wegman and Carter [WC] [CW].
Figure 1: A one-way quantum channel and a two-way classical channel are needed for
QKD.
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Wiesner was the first to propose utilizing quantum entanglement for security in 1970.
However, his paper on photon storage as identification for digital money was rejected
from publication until 1983 [W83]. Bennett and Brassard [BB84] realized the quantum
state of photons would be better used for transmission instead of storage. They published
the first QKD protocol, the famous BB84 protocol. They subsequently filled in the
reconciliation and privacy amplification procedures for this scheme [BBBSS, BBR85,
BBR88, and BBCM] and presented an experimental demonstration [BBBSS]. BB84 has
attracted most of the followers both in experimental demonstration and in theoretical
analysis. Two other protocols were proposed by Ekert [E91] using EPR pairs and by
Bennett [B92] using two non-orthogonal quantum states (instead of four states in BB84).
A modification of BB84 using six states to increase the security at the cost of throughput
was proposed by Bruf3 [B98].
Two main methods were used in most of quantum key experiments: photon polarization
and photon's phases. The first experiment by Bennett and Brassard was performed at the
distance of 32 cm [BB89, BBBSS]. Marand and Townsend [MT] reported transmission
over 30 km of commercial optical fiber in the lab. Muller, Zbinden, and Gisin [MZG]
reported transmission of 22.7 km over optical cable under Lake Geneva. A single photon
transmitted over a 48 km optical fiber network was reported by Hughes et. al. in 1999
[HMP]. Outdoor transmission in nighttime of almost 1 km was reported by Buttler et. al.
[BHKLL].
The technical challenges for the QKD are single photon light sources, low attenuation
optical fiber, and high efficiency single photon detectors with higher frequency
capability. Numerous research efforts are in progress to produce single photon sources
(e.g. Brunei et. al. [BLTO] and Kim et. al. [KBKY]). The loss of photon signals over a
long distance is another limitation. While current commercially available optical fiber has
attenuation about 0.2 dB/km, exotic optical fiber with 0.01 dB/km has been found. The
latter will allow photon transmission up to 1000 km for 10% of the photons available at
the receiving end. The system throughput and operating range will improve from the
above research efforts. Another challenging practical problem for QKD is the
development ofmulti-user network.
I will briefly introduce the aspects of BB84 protocol that are related to this study, recount
one system performance analysis by Slutsky et. al. [SSMRF], and then the details of
reconciliation procedure in [BBBSS] and the improvement procedure in [BS].
1.2 Quantum States
Before explaining BB84 protocol, 111 give a short introduction to the quantum states. In
the classic information theory, a Shannon bit is either 1 or 0, but by no means both at the
same time. On the other hand, a quantum bit, or qubit, can be both 1 and 0 at the same
time. This is the so-called superposition of states.
Using light polarization as an example, a photon can be in a vertically polarized state |t>,
we assign a label "1" to this state. It can be in a horizontally polarized state |<->>, we
assign a label "0" to this state. Or, it can be in a superposition of these states. In this case,
we interpret its state as representing both 0 and 1 at the same time. The vertically and
horizontally polarized states is a set of basis for QKD, which is called rectilinear basis.
After a measurement, a photon state collapses to the measurement state. For example, the
vertically polarized sunglasses eliminate glare by letting through only vertically polarized
light, while filtering out the horizontally polarized light. The sunglasses are measurement
devices in this sense, and the light polarization collapses any photon state to the vertical
polarization state after this measurement. A vertically or horizontally polarized photon
can pass through a vertically (or horizontally) polarized measurement filter and register a
" 1 " or "0" deterministically in a single-photon-detector.
Another set of basis states is |to (polarized at 45) and \\> (polarized at 135), which is
called diagonal basis. Any photon state can be represented by a superposition of the
diagonal basis as well as by a superposition of the rectilinear basis. Light polarized in \?>
(or in |\>) state has equal probability being in 1 or 0 state ifmeasured in the rectilinear
basis. Likewise, light polarized in |I> (or in \^>) state has equal probability being in 1 or
0 state ifmeasured in the diagonal basis. If the photon signals are prepared by the sender
in one basis (e.g. rectilinear) and measured by the receiver in another basis (diagonal),
then the result of the measurement will not relate to information from the sender.
Photons can also be circularly polarized: this set of basis |0> and 1 0> is called circular
basis. Any two of these three sets of bases can be used in BB84 protocol.
1.3 BB84 protocol
The BB84 protocol requires two sets of orthogonal quantum states. Using photon
polarization example, Alice needs to have the capability of preparing photons in any of
the two orthogonal quantum states and Bob have the capability ofmeasuring photon
signals in both bases. There are four stages for this protocol.
Stage 1 : communication over quantum channel
Alice prepares two random sequences of bits. One of the random bit sequences decides
which quantum basis to use (basis bits, the first row in Fig. 2a). Another binary bit
sequence will be used to construct secret key (key bits, the second row in Fig. 2a). The
polarization state of each photon Alice sends is determined by the key bit and the basis
bit (the third row in Fig. 2a). Bob prepares independently another random string of bits
(basis bits, the first row ofBob's action in Fig. 2a) that determine which basis he will use
to measure each incoming photon (the measurement result, the second row ofBob's
action in Fig. 2a). Because of the properties of quantum states, when Bob uses the same
basis as Alice's, Bob measurement result is the same as Alice's key bit (except
transmission error). This is shown in boldface basis selection in the first row from Alice
and Bob's action. When Bob uses different basis from Alice's, then Bob's measurement
results are uncorrelated to Alice's key bits, or -50% ofBob's result is the same as Alice's
key. This is shown in light face basis selection in the first row ofAlice and Bob's action.
Stage 2: communication over classical channel
Phase 1 : raw key extraction
After the quantum transmission, Alice and Bob compare their basis bits, but not the
key bits. They keep the key bits only when the basis bits were the same. This is called
raw key (the bit sequence in the third row ofBob's action in Fig. 2a). About 50% of
the quantum transmission will be discarded because of the independent random basis
selection by Alice and Bob (the white cells in the third row of Bob's action in Fig. 2a).
Figure 2: BB84 quantum communication example -
Alice and Bob agree to use the rectilinear (ffl) and the diagonal (El) bases. \t> represents
"1"
and |<->> "0" in rectilinear basis. |\> represents "1" and |7> "0" in diagonal basis.
a): In the absence of eavesdropping activity: Photon polarization sent by Alice is decided
by the message bit and the basis bit. Bob's independent random choice of basis in
measurement resulted in loss of 50% of quantum transmission when the bases do not
match.
Alice
random bases selection ffl ei s El ffl El m El ffl El El ffl
random message 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
photon polarization sent t 7 7 \ t 7 <-> !\ -> \ 7 t
Bob
random bases selection El El ffl El ffl El ffl B ffl ffl El El
measurement result 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
raw key 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
b): In the presence of eavesdropping activity: Intercept/resend attack by Eve alters the
photon polarization states as Eve has to make random choice of basis before Bob. The
presence ofEve can be detected when Alice and Bob compared a substring and found
25% errors in raw key (boldface digits in the last row).
Alice
random bases selection ffl El El El ffl El ffl El ffl El El ffl
random message 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
photon polarization sent t 7 7 f\ t 7 <-* \ -> |\ 7 t
Eve
random bases selection El ffl ffl El ffl ffl El El ffl ffl ? El
measurement result 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
photon polarization sent !\
<-> t |\ t t 7 f\ <-> <-> 7 \
Bob
random bases selection H El ffl E ffl El ffl ffl ffl ffl El Ki
measurement result 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
raw key 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
Phase 2: Error estimation
Over the classic channel, Alice and Bob compare a random subset of the raw key to
estimate the error rate p, and then delete this subset from their raw keys to produce
their tentative final key. If the error rate is within certain limit, they accept it as the
physical limitation of their quantum devices, such as transmission errors, detection
errors, etc. If the error rate is too high, they assume Eve is listening in on the quantum
channel, and they discard everything and start over again.
Phase 3: Reconciliation or error correction
The reconciliation procedure will be described in more detail in section 1.4. Alice and
Bob use this interactive parity check procedure to locate error bits. Communication of
parity checks over the classical channel leaks information to Eve. Reconciliation leads
to information leakage many times of the error rate. The goal is to minimize the
number of parity checks while keeping the residue error rate low (high reliability).
The reconciled key is derived after discarding leakage due to parity checks.
Phase 4: Privacy Amplification
Alice and Bob now have a common reconciled key that is partially known to Eve.
Alice and Bob take into account various information leakage due to various form of
Eve's attacks and, in addition, add a security margin S. They choose a random hash
function based on these parameters to ensure Eve's average information about the
secret key is 2"7ln2 bits. The final key is derived after privacy amplification.
The most likely form of attacks is intercept/resend and beam splitting. The
intercept/resend attack is a measurement on-line, which will cause disturbance of the
quantum channel and is illustrated in Fig. 2b. Alice's action is the same as in Fig. 2a. Eve
has to guess the measurement basis before Bob (basis bits, the first row of Eve's action in
Fig. 2b). Since a measurement of a quantum state collapses it to the measurement state,
Eve's measurement alters -50% of the photon polarization states (compare the photon
states sent by Alice and those by Eve, the last row ofAlice and Eve's action).
Subsequently, half of Bob's measurement of these altered photon states will be in error,
or a 25% error rate in Bob's raw key (the boldfaced digits in the last row of Bob's action
in Fig. 2b). This is why Alice and Bob can catch Eve's activity in phase 2 of stage 2.
Eve's counter move is to measure a fraction of the quantum transmission so that the
overall disturbance will be below the error tolerance in the quantum channel. Eve will
then use an error-free quantum channel to resend the quantum states to Bob. There are
many other ways Eve can try to minimize disturbance and to maximize information gain.
The maximum information leakage due to Eve's attack is an open research topic.
Advance analyses (e.g. Fuchs et. al. [FGGNP]) in eavesdropping strategies using future
technologies continuously enlarge the bound of Eve's information. Such advance
analyses are beyond the scope of this introduction. Because of the intercept/resend
strategy, a secure QKD protocol has to assume all errors are the result of eavesdropping,
and allows a conservative estimate of Eve's information base on the error rate p estimated
from phase 2 of stage 2. This is dealt with in the privacy amplification step and will be
discussed further in section 1.5.
The beam splitting attack works on multi-photon states. The distribution of states from a
common laser light source is typically in Poisson distribution. Eve splits the multiple
photon states sent by Alice, passes one to Bob, and stores the rest. After Alice and Bob
announce the bases used in their communication, Eve obtains 100% information on the
photon states that she acquired from beam-splitting. Since this measurement is off-line,
Alice and Bob will not be able to detect the presence of beam/splitting attack. The
counter measure by Alice and Bob is to use an exotic single photon source or to lower the
average number of photons (|i) emitted by a common light source, typically at the range
of 0.1 photons per pulse. This limits the useful pulse to -10%, yet reduces multi-photon
pulses to -1% (p2). Again, this is considered further in section 1.5.
1.4 Reconciliation procedure
Because the reconciliation procedure is performed over the classical channel, every parity
check that Alice and Bob compare will be known to Eve. For the purpose of breaking the
key, knowing the parity of a block is just as informative as knowing one bit
deterministically; either way, the number of combinations Eve needs to try to break the
key goes down by a factor of two. Alice and Bob need to throw away one bit each time
they do a parity check to neutralize this information leakage to Eve. Eve's lost her
knowledge of this block as the discarded bit, unknown to Eve, can be either "0" or "1"
and the parity for the rest of the block can go either way. The problem is to design the
most efficient algorithm to minimize the information leakage (fewest number of parity
checks) while leaving as few residue errors as possible (high reliability or low residue bit
error rate). I will first describe the reconciliation procedure used in [BBBSS], which I
will call BB84 reconciliation procedure, and then discuss the improved CASCADE
method from [BS], which I will call BS reconciliation procedure.
1.4.1 BB84 reconciliation procedure
Stage one of BB84 reconciliation
Together, Alice and Bob randomly divide the tentative final key into blocks of size k\.
The block size is selected such that few blocks contain more than one error. Therefore, k\
is a function of error rate p. Alice sends the parity of each block to Bob. Bob compares
them to his parities and both discard the last bit from each block. For blocks with parity
error, a binary search procedure is used to locate the error. For the rest of this thesis, I
will use
"BINARY"
to represent the binary search routine. BINARY is a standard divide
and conquer method: divide the block into two halves, compare the parity of one half,
and discard the last bit of the subblock for each parity check; these are done recursively
until the block size becomes one1. The number of parity checks need to locate an error bit
1 Notice that sometimes the BINARY search may not find the error bit location because the error bit may be discarded by
chance.
is a function of block size; literature typically uses the upper bound for information loss:
[~log(i)l bit loss per error bit (all logarithms are to the base 2 in this thesis). This is called
the first pass. Some error bits remain undetected after the first pass.
Then they repeat the process (the second pass): randomly divide the remaining bits into
blocks of length k2, compare parities and discard the last bit of each block, and do
BINARY on blocks with parity error. Then again repeat the process (the third pass) by
randomly dividing the remaining bits into blocks of length of Jk3, and so on. They will do
several passes until the number of errors in all the remaining bits is small enough
(probably less than two). The block size selection rule, to have few blocks containing
multiple error bits, applies to all passes. As the error rate decreases after each pass,
obviously the block size increases after each pass, i.e. k+i > k- However, the exact
formula on block size was not given in [BBBSS].
Stage two of BB84 reconciliation
Alice and Bob take randomly half of the remaining bits, do a parity check, and discard
one bit. If they succeed 20 times without parity errors, they will accept the final string as
reconciled key at 2"20 error rate (or less), or about one error bit in a million. If anytime
they find a parity error, they use BINARY to locate the error and start over from the
beginning of the stage two. The BINARY procedure is costly at this stage, so it is
important to know when to transition from the first stage to the second stage. Again, this
formula is not well defined in [BBBSS]. Notice that the above residue error rate
estimation is conservative.
1 .4.2 BS reconciliation procedure
Brassard and Salvail made an inspiring improvement which they called CASCADE [BS].
In this procedure, Alice and Bob will not discard a bit immediately after parity checks.
Instead, they will mark a bit to be discarded later. This change increases the number of
parity checks needed to locate the error bit, but guarantees to locate an error bit. Bob will
correct his error bit. Because of such changes, each block will contain an even number of
errors (possibly zero) after the error search procedure.
Error search procedure
Alice has a string A and Bob has a string B. Let A = A\, . . ., Ak and B = Bu ..., Bk (with
A\, B\ e {0,1 }). The error search procedure is performed to locate one possible error bit:
1 . Alice sends Bob the parity ofwhole block of k bits.
2. Bob determines whether the parity of his block is different. If so, Bob informs Alice
to continue with the BINARY procedure. If not, stop.
If the error search stops at step 2, k bits remain to be in one single block and this block
has an even number (possibly zero) of error bits.
BINARY procedure
1 . Alice divides A into two subblocks of sizes [k/2~] and \_k/2J, respectively, and sends
the parity of the first half to Bob.
2. Bob determines which subblock contains an odd number of errors. If the size of that
subblock is one, stop, this is the error bit and Bob corrects his bit. If the size of that
subblock is larger than one, Bob replaces B with that subblock and informs Alice
which subblock to continue. Alice also replaces A with that subblock. Both reduce k
accordingly. Go back to step 1.
Although Alice only send the parity of the first half to Bob at step one, combining with
the parity of the whole block sent earlier, the parity of the second half is also known to
Bob (and to Eve). The halfwithout parity error will not be processed further. Therefore,
at the end of BINARY procedure, the original block is broken down into riog(&)l +1 or
Tlog(/:jl subblocks, each subblock has an even number (possibly zero) of error bits.
Alice and Bob share a tentative final key which is n bits long and with bit error rate p.
On average, pn bits of Bob's string are different from Alice's (error bits). The goal is to
remove multiple error bits, it is more efficient to divide A and B into subblocks before
applying the error search procedure. LetA=Au...,An and B = B\, ...,Bn (withA B\ e
{0,1 }) be Alice's and Bob's strings, respectively.
BINARY sweep procedure
Alice and Bob choose a block size k and divide their string into blocks of k bits. They
perform error search procedure on every subblock with parity error.
Notice that before the BINARY sweep, there are \nlk\ blocks. After the BINARY sweep,
the number of blocks is more than \nlk\ . Many blocks remain k in size, but there are also
many smaller blocks. All blocks have an even number of errors after BINARY sweep.
Now, the BS reconciliation procedure is described below:
the first pass of BS reconciliation
Alice and Bob choose the initial block size h and perform the BINARY sweep
procedure. Let K\ = {Ku, ..., Ki,}, . . . } be the set of all blocks after the first pass (blocks
of sizes ki or smaller).
the fth pass of BS reconciliation: i > 1
1. Alice and Bob randomly permute (or interleave) all n bits. This interleaver is referred
to as random interleaver; interleaver design is one of the main topics of this thesis
(see for instance section 2.2.3.3).
2. They choose h and perform BINARY sweep procedure.
Let Kx = {KuU . . ., Kij, . . . } be the set of all blocks after BINARY sweep of the /th pass.
Some blocks in K\, . . ., K[.\ now show parity error and they put all these blocks in a
queue, Q. Then they perform the following CASCADE procedure:
1. If Q is empty, then stop. If not, find the smallest block Km<] in Q (1 < m < i).
2. Apply BINARY to Kmj and locate an error bit el . The block structure of Km is
updated by replacing Kmj with its subblocks. (The number of elements in Km, \Km\,
increases but ^\Kmj\ remains the same). Bob corrects his error bit.
3. For 1 < q < i, find A:qij(q) such that el e ATqj(q) (j(q) is simply different block index for
each pass). IfKqm s Q,, then delete KqM from Q\ ifKqm < Q, then add A:q,j(q) to Q.
4. Go to step 1.
The guideline for the block size selection at the start of each pass is that few blocks
contain more than one error bit. Therefore, k{ =f(p), the initial block size depends on
input error rate. An initial block size selection and block size doubling after each pass
(&i = 2k{.{) are recommended in [BS]. With this parameter set, the error rate is reduced at
least by half after each pass. For 10000 bits input size and 10 runs, no residue errors were
found after four passes.
Given a block size k and input bit error rate p (BER), the probability of having x number
of errors in this block follows the binomial distribution:
Bin(x,k,p) =
rk"
x
\ j
px(l-pf~x (1)
It can be shown that the probability that a block has an odd number of errors is [W75]:
Pu= 1 Bin(2i-l,k,p)= l~h2Pf (2)
= 1
After the BINARY of the first pass, the BER is reduced by the amount ofp0&dk\: (k = k\
here and the denominator k\ is to convert p0id to bit error rate)
p>=p- V (3)
Because the complicated CASCADE procedure, error rate and information leakage after
the second pass or later were not obtained in [BS]. Instead, upper bounds were given. The
BS reconciliation procedure suggests how to choose the block size for the first pass. Each
subsequent pass will double the block size of the previous pass. In such a way, it is
proven in [BS] that
10
It will be shown later that this bound for residue error rate is too weak to be useful.
1.5 System Performance Analysis
I have explained the QKD protocol and the reconciliation procedure. Basically, the
reconciliation procedure will affect the QDK throughput and the residue error rate. The
QKD system also has an upper limit on the input error rate beyond which no secure key
can be derived (BER of 7%~9% was derived as the upper limit in [SSMRF]). A
reconciliation procedure with higher throughput will allow a higher upper limit on input
BER. The role of the reconciliation procedure in the overall QKD system performance is
discussed below.
Privacy, security, throughput, and reliability are some important system performance
parameters. Privacy means that Eve has little knowledge about the secret key. Security is
that Eve cannot fool Alice and Bob into thinking they have a private key. Throughput is
how many bits are derived from QKD during a fixed time period (e.g. one-second).
Reliability is how often Alice and Bob will get wrong bit in their shared, final secret key.
Privacy and secrecy are by far the most important concerns in any encryption scheme
including QKD. These two parameters were, and still are, the main focus in the literature.
Another parameter is the system yield. Given a set of hardware capability, the yield may
be considered as directly proportional to throughput. In the experimental example
demonstrated in [BBBSS], in the duration of 715,000 of photon pulses and 4% error rate,
only 754 bits were derived eventually. This is slightly over 0.1% yield. More recent
analyses by Slutsky et. al. [SSMRF] showed that 104~105 per second throughput, based
on 50 ns pulse frequency. This yields only a fraction of one percent also.
Reliability of the final shared string is one parameter that is seldom discussed in the
literature. The upper bound of output error rate is 10"6 in [BBBSS] and about five percent
of the input error rate in [BS]. Privacy amplification generates the final secret key from
reconciled key by randomly selecting subgroups from the reconciled key and taking the
parity of each subgroup as the key bit. Therefore, privacy amplification also amplifies the
error rate as the residue error bits are used many times in various subblocks. It seems the
impact of privacy amplification on reliability was not discussed in the literature.
Depending on the application, such error rate in the key may or may not be acceptable.
For some applications such as encryption of plain text using a one-time pad, errors in key
may not be critical as there is plenty of redundancy. For other applications, the error rate
needs to be tighter (such as keys for further standard encryption, or transmitting
compressed data using a one-time pad). For certain applications, the reliability of the
final string may need to be essentially error free (such as keys used in military mission).
The maximizing of one particular performance parameter will generally be made at a cost
to the other performance parameters. For example, to improve the privacy, one could
sacrifice yield and error rate in the privacy amplification step. To improve reliability, one
can do more passes in reconciliation and again, lose yield. The optimization of the whole
system is not likely to happen soon. In fact, the optimization of a single system
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component (between the throughput and reliability in reconciliation procedure from
[BS]) is a difficult problem.
The impact of the reconciliation procedure on the system throughput is illustrated in
[SSMRF]. I redraw their analysis in Fig. 3. In this figure, m represents the number of
photon pulses Alice sends, a the attenuation in the quantum channel (the fraction of
photons that reached Bob's detector), r\ the efficiency of Bob's measurement device, [i the
average number of photons per pulse, eT the total number of errors in the string.
Therefore, the size for the tentative final key as the input of reconciliation procedure is
n = 0.5a\xm and er= pn. The main path of Fig. 3 illustrates the three most important
factors (a, \i, and m) that greatly and directly affect throughput. The upper path of
Figure 3 illustrates the effects of eavesdropping on the throughput that are related to the
observed error rate p. Many factors affect observed errors: the channel attenuation, the
channel error rate, dark count of the measurement device, \] and u,. The limit of the
system security is estimated to be 9% in [SSMRF], above which no secure QKD can be
achieved. One key observation from this figure is that the largest item that leads to
information leakage is the reconciliation procedure (~7*ex= Ipn). However, as will be
seen later in Fig. 4, the estimation of information leakage of Ipn was not quite accurate.
The factor 7 should not be a constant, instead, it should be a function ofp. This factor
decreases as p goes up. Therefore, the 9% estimation was too conservative. When p is
small, the effect of reconciliation on throughput is insignificant. Improvement of
reconciliation procedure can help the system throughput only when p is large.
As a side note, one recent paper by Ardehali et. al. [ACL] claimed nearly doubling the
throughput of the BB84 protocol. This is achieved by, instead of randomizing the
quantum bases in transmission, using bias toward one set of bases over another by both
Alice and Bob.
Much hope in throughput increase (by leaps and bounds) comes from hardware
improvements: thousand fold increase in pulse rate from pico-second electro-optical
devices, single photon light sources, reduction in transmission error rate in optical
alignment, or reduction in attenuation by low loss optical-fiber. On the other hand, the
optimal performance of one component may not match the optimal performance of
another component. One example is the optimal wavelengths are different for optical
fiber, light source, and detection efficiency. Improving the reconciliation procedure will
have a small effect on the overall throughput (roughly a factor of two at most). However,
improving the reconciliation procedure may allow higher upper limit ofp for QKD,
which, in turn, allows more flexibility in choosing system components for system design
engineers.
Unlike its small impact on throughput, improvement in the reconciliation procedure will
have a big impact on reliability and is the only place where reliability can be achieved.
Reliability is less extensively covered in the literature (some discussions can be found in
a series of papers by Mayers and Yao [M, MY, MYa]), in contrast to the well covered
subjects of privacy and security. In the experimental examples from [BBBSS], the
reliability is
2"20 (or ~10"6), which may not be suitable for those critical applications. One
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may be tempted to do more parity checks at the second stage of the BB84 reconciliation
procedure to increase reliability . However, one needs to have a good estimate of residue
error rate before going into the second stage of the BB84 reconciliation procedure that
still requires more passes in the first stage of reconciliation. Besides, the second stage of
the BB84 reconciliation procedure may not be the most efficient way of trading
throughput for reliability. Although the authors observed no error left in their simulation
of 10 runs after four passes in [BS], the bound on output BER is very weak. Therefore, to
optimize the reconciliation procedure, one needs to have a better method to define the
residue BER, which allows more accurate trade-off between throughput and reliability.
1.6 The need of more reconciliation analysis
In summary, the problems that need to be studied further in the BS reconciliation
procedure are:
1) Optimal block size and block size schedule;
2) Lack of accurate estimate of output BER;
3) Lack of accurate estimate of information leak;
4) The window forp (input BER) was extended to 15% (up from 9% from [SSMRF]).
Can we do better?
2 Simulation results and analysis
I will compare the performance ofmy improved reconciliation procedure to the
simulation result of [BS], and the data from [BBBSS] in section 2.1. Then, I will show an
analysis procedure to calculate the CASCADE performance in section 2.2. Finally, I will
discuss how the improvement in reconciliation was achieved in section 2.3.
2.1 Simulation results comparison
The throughput comparison is shown in Fig. 4, and again in Fig. 5. In Fig. 4, the y-axis is
the average number of parity checks needed to find one error bit. This is the parameter
typically used for comparison in QKD literature and it is more useful from the privacy
parameter point of view. In Fig. 5, the y-axis is throughput, which is more useful from the
system performance point of view.
My simulation results of the BS reconciliation procedure are almost the same as the
simulation data report in [BS]2, and very close to the information leakage bound given in
[BS] (Fig. 4). Note that the error bound given in [BS] overestimated the information
leakage at high input BERs (this will be addressed in section 2.2.1). BB84 experimental
data is also shown in this figure. The advantage of the BS procedure over the BB84
procedure is mainly at low input BER, which confirm the improvement claimed by [BS].
My method, also shown in Fig. 4, outperforms the BS procedure at all input BERs.
All parameters were set at the recommended block size value, block size schedule for the four passes, and the batch size.
The results of this simulation are an average of 200 runs or more, while there were only 10 runs in [BS] report.
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From the throughput point of view, the BS procedure shows only minor improvement at
low input BER (Fig. 5). My procedure shows insignificant advantage over the BS
procedure at low input BER. At high BER, the advantage ofmy improvement is clearly
significant. The highest input BER that can be used in my procedure is 30%, at which
-1.8% of bits remained after reconciliation.
Table 1, which is the same data as in Fig. 4 and 5, shows both throughput and reliability
data. The reliability data, or the observed residue BER, is the observed total residue error
bits divided by n, then averaged over the number of runs. For the BS procedure at high
input BER, three passes are sufficient to remove all error bits. Four passes were
recommended in [BS] because, sporadically, one or two error-pairs are missed for low
input BER runs. This suggests that error-pairs, due to the randomized permutation of bits
after the each pass, stick together through the first three passes. Ill call this problem
"error-pair sticking."This problem can be avoided, or reduced, by using an interleaver
other than randomization. Interleaver design is discussed in section 2.2.3.3.
Because the sporadic nature of the residue errors, the observed output BER is only a
rough estimation. Those zero BER shown in Table 1 merely indicate that no errors were
observed during hundreds of test runs. Because the output BER is so low, billions of runs
are needed to get an accurate estimate of output BER. Therefore, such simulation cannot
be useful for defining the reliability of the QKD. The analytical approach in sections
2.2.1 and 2.2.3 is our best hope to derive reliability parameter.
One way to dissect the performance of CASCADE of the BS reconciliation procedure is
to trace its performance at the end of the second pass, so that the BER is measurable. This
is shown in Table 2 at input BER of 15%. The top ofTable 2 shows results a run with
10k bit input size and the bottom with 500k input size. Notice that the average
percentages of bits left are about the same at various passes, independent of the input
batch size. However, the residue BER is much smaller for the larger input size. Some
runs are error free at the end of the second pass while others contain some number of
hidden errors. The number of runs containing two, four, six, or eight errors at the end of
the second pass is also listed for the 10k input size. The following list summarizes the
shortcomings of the BS procedure and surprises:
1) The BS reconciliation procedure recommends four passes. However, my simulation
clearly indicates that three passes are needed at most.
2) The residue error rate at the end of second pass (8.6E-5) is much lower than the upper
bound reported in [BS] (3.34E-2).
3) Most of the time, the residue errors were in pairs (see middle ofTable 2).
4) More intriguing, with larger input batch size, the residue error rate is lowered (1.5E-6
for n = 500k, bottom ofTable 2).
5) The BS reconciliation procedure overestimated information leakage at high input
BER (Fig. 4).
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Table 2: Simulation results after each pass of the BS reconciliation procedure. Notice the
lower BER at the end of second pass with larger input size.
observations from 220 runs with 10k bits input and 15% BER.
pass 0 1 2 3 4
avg. % bits left 100% 60.1% 31.35% 26.3% 23.8%
BER 15% 6.7% 8.6E-05 0 0
number of runs with x error bits left after 2nd pass
x 0 2 4 6 8
# of runs 147 56 13 3 1
observations from 13 runs with 500k bits input and 15% BER.
pass 0 1 2 3 4
avg. % bits left 100% 60.1% 31.42% 26.4% 23.9%
BER 15% 6.7% 1.5E-06 0 0
Table 3: The number of parity checks needed to locate one error bit, i(k), after finding
parity error in block of size k (equation (5)). The upper bound is given in the third
column.
k i(k) riogwi
1 0.00 0
2 1.00 1
3 1.67 2
4 2.00 2
5 2.40 3
6 2.67 3
7 2.86 3
8 3.00 3
9 3.22 4
10 3.40 4
2.2 Analysis
2.2.1 Tracking CASCADE
The above observations from Table 2 can be explained by tracking the information
leakage and residue BER performance of the BS reconciliation procedure for the first two
passes. At the first pass, only BINARY sweep is applied. At the second pass, both
BINARY sweep and CASCADE are applied. The BINARY sweep
procedure has closed
form formulas that describe the information leakage and the output BER. I will
demonstrate the calculation of the residue BER and the information leakage for the
CASCADE procedure with the restriction that the number of errors per block is less than
four.
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When there are many blocks of size k and with parity error, the average number of parity
checks, i{k), needed to locate one error bit is derived as the following recursive formula:
i(l) = 0andi(2)=l;and
f(ifc) = ^l|(r*/2l) + ^'i(L*/2j) + l (5)
The last term accounts for the one parity check that determines which half the error bit is
located. The first two terms are just the probability of error being in each half times the
cost of locating error bit in that half. Table 3 shows some values from this formula and
comparison to the crude upper bound used in the literature. Notice that when k = 5, the
bound used in literature is 25% too big. This is the reason that the bound from [BS] is
larger than simulation atp = 0.15 (corresponding to k = 5), as observed in Fig. 4.
The analysis strategy is to separate the BINARY sweep portion from CASCADE
tracking for the second and later passes. The CACADE procedure will be divided into
smaller steps and will utilize the information from BINARY sweep.
BINARY sweep in pass one
The output BER, p\, can be calculated from equation (3). The information leakage I\ from
the first pass is:
h = *{l+Podd*Kh)) (6)
where podd is given by equation (2). The first term in the parentheses is due to the the
parity checks of all blocks, and the second term is the successive parity checks due to
BINARY for the blocks with parity error.
BINARY sweep in pass two
After the BINARY sweep, the BERp2, and the information leakage I2, can be calculated
using again the same formulas as in pass one.
-,
l-(l-2p,f2
Pi =P\ 2k,
_
l-(l-2Af2
Podd,2 2
(7)
(8)
Io = n *(l+Podd,2*Kk2)) (9)
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CASCADE in pass two: RF.R
For easy reference, the BINARY sweep in pass one will be referred to as round 1 (r = 1)
and the BINARY sweep in pass as round 2 (r = 2). The CASCADE will be further
divided into several smaller steps, each will be referred to as round 3 and larger (r = 3, 4,
. . .). During the CASCADE procedure, BINARY is applied to the blocks in the Q in the
order of block size and Q contains blocks from both K\ and K2. To simplify the
calculation, I will assume there are two queues, >i and Q2, one for each pass. <2i is a
subset of K{ and Q2 a subset of K2. At the end of the first pass, all blocks in Ki have even
number of error bits and, therefore, Qx is empty. At the end of round two, Q2 is empty but
some blocks in K\ now show parity error because the error bits found and corrected
during round two are randomly distributed in K{. These blocks will be placed in <2i-
BINARY is then applied to all the blocks in gi and this is called round three (r = 3). At
the end of round three, Q\ is again empty but Q2 is not because the errors found during
round three are randomly distributed in K2. BINARY is then applied to all blocks in Q2
and this is called round four (r = 4). This process alternates between Q\ and Q2 until both
<2i and Q2 are empty.
Notice the odd round number means BINARY is applied to blocks in K\ and the even
round number means BINARY is applied to blocks in K2. The above simplification seem
to have little impact on output BER, but it does over-estimate the information leakage a
little bit. At the end of this section I will partially correct this small over-estimate.
To further simplify the calculation, I will consider only x < 3 by assuming the probability
ofx > 4 is negligible. In other words, a block can have at most one hidden error-pair after
BINARY. This assumption is pretty safe with the small k\ recommended in [BS].
Let ht and er represent the number of hidden errors and the number of exposed errors
after round r, and hx + eT= ht.\. For example, h\ =p\n, h2 =p2n, and e2 = hi -h2 = (pi-p2)n
are already known. Now the problem is to find er for each round r > 3.
For each round r we need information from the previous two rounds (r-1 and r-2) to
calculate ex. Both round r and round r-2 are dealing with block structure K\ if r is odd, or
K2 if r is even. At the end of round r-2, there are hr.2 hidden error bits (set T). By the
above assumption ofx < 3, these hT.2 bits are distributed in hr.2/2 blocks in K\ (or in K2)
each having one hidden error-pair. During round r-1, set Tis divided into two subsets, eT.\
bits in set E are exposed and ht.\ bits in set H remain hidden (T=ED H). The bits in E is
randomly distributed in these hr.2/2 hidden error-pairs. Therefore, the probability of one
of these ht.2l2 hidden error-pairs having y number of error bits in E is according to a
binomial distribution Biniy, 2, et.\IKi), where 0 < y < 2. In round r, those blocks in Kx (or
K2) containing a hidden error-pair which has one error bit in E (y = 1) are now showing
parity error and BINARY will be applied to these blocks to detect another error bit.
Therefore, the number of hidden error bits and the BER after each round r are:
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er=Bin{l,2,er_xlhr_2)^hj^2_ (10)
K=hr_l-Bin(l,2,l-hr_l/hr_2)*!h^2_ (11)
hr
Pr = ir (12)
These equations completely map out how the residue error rate diminishes at each round
of CASCADE. The CASCADE will proceed, on the average, until er< 1, and at the end
of the second pass, p2 = pr. Notice that et is proportional to n; therefore, the larger input
size, the more rounds of CASCADE will be performed.
As an example, I will calculate the BER and information leakage through two passes of
the BS procedure atp = 0.15 and n = 10k. The BINARY sweep portion of this calculation
is shown in Table 4 and the tracking of pr during CASCADE is shown in Table 5. Notice
that ex < 1 at r = 10, and CASCADE stops at this point. Therefore, p'2 = pw ~ 3.3E-5 for
n = 10k. If n = 500k, er < 1 until r = 14 (the column of er times 50), and p'2 = pu ~ 1 . 1E-6
in this case. This observation nicely explains why the output BER was found smaller at
larger input batch size in Table 2.
The result of the above CASCADE tracking example, p2 ~ 3.3E-5, is much closer to the
experimental observation in Table 2 (8.6E-5) than the error bound given in [BS] (3.3E-2).
The error bound given in [BS] is too weak to be useful. The small difference between the
above CASCADE tracking example and experimental observation in Table 2 is explained
in the following paragraphs.
Notice that allowing bits in E to be randomly distributed in T implies that a hidden error-
pair in one pass cannot form the same error-pair for the other pass; otherwise, some of the
hr.2/2 hidden error-pairs will exclude bits from E. In other words, this derivation forbids
the "error-pair sticking", which is one important factor in interleaver design, as will be
discussed in section 2.2.3.3.
Using a random interleaver in constructing blocks for each pass, some hidden error-pairs
from the first pass have a small but definite probability to be in the same block of the
second pass (and then in the same block of the third pass). Ill refer to this as "error-pair
sticking" in this thesis. The error-pair sticking is not allowed in the way the CASCADE
tracking in Table 5 is calculated. The error-pair sticking problem is more serious when
the input size is small and the initial block size is large, as expected from the use of a
random interleaver. This is why the error-pair sticking is observed at low input BER
(larger initial block size) in Table 1 and why most hidden errors were in pairs at the end
of the second pass, as reported in Table 2.
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Table 4: The output BER and information leakage from the first two rounds of the BS
reconciliation procedure. The input size n = 10k bits and/? = 0.15.
round block #of Pi #of #of total # # of
size k input eqn(3) errors errors of bits
error or left = exposed parity left
bits eqn(7) p\*n = ne checks
h
1 5 1500 6.68% 668 832 3996.8 6003.2
2 10 668 2.87% 287 381 2295.4 3707.8
Table 5: Tracking of error rate during CASCADE for the first two passes.
input parameters:
input size n = 10k bits, p = 15%, k\ = 5,k2= 10
round K er Pr
0 1500 0 15%
1 668.1 831.9 6.68%
2 287.2 380.9 2.87%
3 123.3 163.9 1.23%
4 52.9 70.4 0.53%
5 22.7 30.2 2.3E-03
6 9.8 13.0 9.8E-04
7 4.19 5.57 4.2E-04
8 1.80 2.39 1.8E-04
9 0.77 1.03 7.7E-05
10 0.33 0.44 3.3E-05
11 0.14 0.19 1.4E-05
12 0.06 0.08 6.1E-06
13 0.03 0.03 2.6E-06
14 0.01 0.01 1.1E-06
15 0.005 0.01 4.8E-07
16 0.002 0.00 2.1E-07
An efficient implementation of reconciliation procedure needs to avoid error-pair sticking
with a better interleaver design. In section 2.2.2, 1 will estimate the contribution from this
error-pair sticking using the parameters of the above example, just to support this claim.
Another type of error that will escape the detection from CASCADE is the "error-cluster"
formation, discussed in section 2.2.3.
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Notice that in the BS reconciliation procedure, the block size for the third pass is twice
the block size of the second pass. Now, it is clearly confirmed that the output BER at the
end of second pass is much lower, the use ofh = 2k2 does not make sense. (Recall the
guideline for choosing block size in [BS] is to have few blocks with more than one error).
There are two ways to utilize this knowledge. One way is to use much larger &3 so long as
it fits the guideline of block size selection. However, this will improve the throughput
only slightly as most of the information leakage occurs at the first two passes. The more
effective way to increase the throughput is to increase the initial block size. I have
implemented the larger block size in my experiments reported in Fig. 4 and 5.
CASCADE in pass two: Information leakage
To simplify the example, again I will ignore multiple error-pairs in one block (i.e. blocks
with x > 4 are not considered). Therefore, only blocks with x - 2 and x = 3 errors (before
BINARY sweep) need to be considered here. As mentioned earlier in section 1 .4.2,
blocks with x = 3 are divided into subblocks of various sizes (an example is shown in
Fig. 8) and one of these subblocks contain one hidden error-pair after the first pass.
Blocks with x = 2 remain intact and also contain one hidden error-pair.
During CASCADE, all these blocks with one hidden error-pair are processed by
BINARY once and only once. The detection of the first bit of the error-pair comes from
the BINARY of the blocks of the other pass; the cost is counted there. The detection of
the second bit of the error-pair is as follows. For blocks with x = 2, the cost ofBINARY
during CASCADE is i{k\-l). The minus one is because one position in this block is
already known to be an error bit. For blocks with x = 3, the cost of BINARY is smaller
thanj'(nti/2~|-l).
The numbers of error-pairs being exposed by CASCADE are:
6i= 2"X and 2= l^r
odd,r>\ even,r>2
for Ki and K2, respectively. Some of these blocks originally have two or three errors
(x = 2 or 3). Let/j be the fraction of blocks with x = 2 for thej'th pass. That is,
fi = Bin(2, kj; Pj.i)/[m(2, kp p-yX) + BinQ, kh pH)] (13)
where p0 =P- Then, the total number of parity checks during the CASCADE for the first
two passes is:
/= i^*te-D*/,+<fc/2i-i)*(i-/,.)] d4)
i = \
For the example given in Table 4, I&2 is found to be 630. The number of bits left is
n-h-I2-I&2 = 3078. This value is slightly smaller than 3135 observed in Table 2.
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The over-estimation in I&2 is now partially adjusted below. In the above calculation, I
assume the BINARY is applied to all blocks in Q{ and then alternately to all blocks in
Qii. During round r of CASCADE, there are ex blocks showing parity error (one of its
error bit is in set E). Similarly, there are dv blocks that have two error bits in set E:
d=Bin{2,%er_xlhr_2)^1^ (15)
For each odd round r, information leakage is over-estimated. Instead of search all blocks
in Q2 during previous round r-1, ifwe search each block one by one according to BS
procedure, the locations of these dr blocks will be known. At that point, it costs less to
search the second error bits in these dT blocks than to search the same error bits in Q2.
The cost of the former is about i(ki -1) and the later i{k2). The amount of over-estimation
due to the above assumption is about
Zdr*{Kk2)-i(k1-l)}
odd, r>3
which is 34 bits in our example. This will bring the total bits left after the second pass
from 3078 to 31 12, even closer to the 3135 observed in Table 2.
The above summation skips round three because BS procedure starts CASCADE at
round three (and the benefit of information leakage reduction starts at round four). By
modifying BS procedure and start CASCADE at round two, there is an additional
reduction in information leakage by d?* {i(k2)-i{k\-l)} which is 152 bits in our example.
This sounds a much bigger benefit than the 34 bits from the application of CASCADE to
all other rounds. However, there is a twist to this modification. This throughput
improvement is realized for larger n and small k\\ for the example given in Table 8 later,
adding this modification to my method increases the throughput from 29.2% to 31.8% at
ki = 5; but this modification also decreases the throughput from 33.4% to 32% at k\ = 16.
One side effect of this modification is that it will leave more error bits undetected at the
end of the second pass and, therefore, more cost of detecting these errors at the third pass.
For example, let [al,a2] and [bl,b2] be two hidden error-pairs in K\ after the first pass,
and [al,bl,cl] are in #2,ai and [a2,b2] are in K2a2 at the beginning of the second pass. If
CASCADE starts at round three as specified in the BS procedure, BINARY will be
applied to block AT2,ai first and there is only 1/3 chance that [al,bl] remain undetected,
resulting a hidden error-cluster (see section 2.2.3 and Fig. 6 for definition of error-
cluster). On the other hand, by starting CASCADE at the round two, usually BINARY
will not be applied to block 2,ai (as its block size is one of the largest in Q) and cl will
be detected first (from application of BINARY to a block in Ki). Consequently, the
hidden error-cluster is almost surely to occur. A smart reconciliation implementation may
decide at which round the CASCADE should start depending on n and k\. This is one of
the future improvement opportunities.
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BINARY sweep of pass threp
Again, after the BINARY sweep, the BER p3, and the information leakage h, can be
calculated using again the same formulas as in pass one.
, l-(l-2p'2fPl=Pl~ [
2k
' (16)
l-(l-2p'2fPodd,3= [
2
' (17>
*[l+Podd,3*i(k3)) (18)h=
After CASCADE, the BER is reduced to , and the information leakage is 73'. The
CASCADE is even more complex as the error discovery process occurs among three
passes. The tracking is similar in spirit to pass two. I will not do this portion of analysis
in this thesis.
2.2.2 Error-pair sticking
The error-pair sticking problem ought to be removed by a better choice of interleaver for
the input bits before each pass. This section is only to confirm that this problem reflects
discrepancy observed in section 2.2.1.
Following the assumption that the probability of multiple error-pairs in a block is
negligible. At the start of the second pass, the error rate is p\. For each of the nlk2 blocks
of the second pass, the number of errors x in the block is binomial distributed with px =
Bin(x, k2, p\). Error-pair sticking is possible when x > 2, 111 restrict the calculation to only
one error-pair sticking possibility even when x > 4. When a block has two errors (x = 2),
the first error bit is freely chosen from any of the hi (orpin) error bits, but the second
error bit has limited choices for error-pair sticking to occur. There are hi-l choices of
error bits but only one of them result in error-pair sticking. Therefore, the probability of
error-pair sticking is l/(/n-l) for x = 2.
The probability of forming error-pair sticking for x = 3 can be divided into two parts. The
first part is the probability that the first two error bits chosen are forming error-pair; that
probability is given above. The second part is when the first two error bits are not an
error-pair but the third error bit makes an error-pair with either one of the first two. The
first error bit is freely chosen from any of the hi error bits, the second error bit has h\-2
out of hi-l possible choices, and the third error bit has two choices out of the rest hx-2
error bits for error-pair sticking to occur. Therefore, the probability for the second part is
2/(/*i-l). In general, the probability of one error-pair sticks to a block of the second pass
with x number of errors is:
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X-l ;
Ps=l-rJ-r (19)
For any block of the second pass with an odd number of errors, BINARY is applied to
locate one of the errors before CASCADE. BINARY may find one bit from the error-pair
and break it up. The probability that one of the error-pair bit is found during this
BINARY is 21x and the probability of this error-pair remain after BINARY is pT= (x-2)/x.
Therefore, the total BER attributed to the error-pair sticking for the first two passes is:
P&2 = 2*
h ln* px*ps*pr
=
-* pr*ps*XYBin(x,k2,Pi) (20)' I P P P ^ 1 Pr*Ps* % l
x=2 "2 x=2 i=l
In our example, the output BER due to error-pair sticking is shown in Table 6. P&2 is
found to be 4.67E-5, which is roughly the difference between the simulation
(BER = 8.6E-5) and the CASCADE tracking (3.3E-5).
2.2.3 Error-cluster formation
The error-pair sticking problem due to random interleaver is explained in the last section.
A better interleaver design may minimize or eliminate error-pair sticking problem. Even
with error-pair sticking possibility eliminated, there are still some errors that remain
undetected after two passes. This can happen if two (or more) hidden error-pairs of the
first pass happen to swap partners and form different hidden error-pairs at the second
pass. Together, these error bits escape the error detection from the CASCADE of the first
two passes. I'll call these groups of error bits as hidden "error-clusters".
2.2.3.1 cluster formation rule
The number of hidden errors in a block in Ki is any even number up to the block size k\;
likewise, a block in K2 up to the block size k2. Additionally, a better interleaver may
achieve the following rule: that no two bits from the second pass can be in the same block
of the first pass (equation (22) below). With these two rules, one can build the types of
"legal"
clusters that are allowed. I will show a few simple examples of cluster types
which are legal and which are not.
The clusters will be named as c-a,(3-%,5, where a is the number of blocks from the first
pass that's involved in the cluster, (3 the number of hidden errors in each block of the first
pass, X is the number of blocks from the second pass that's involved in the cluster, 8 the
number of hidden errors in each block of the second pass. Some
"legal" hidden
error-clusters after two passes are illustrated in Fig. 6. In this figure, each hidden error bit
is labeled and each row represents the hidden errors in a block of the first or the second
pass. Notice that each block contains an even number of errors and no pair of error bits
are repeated at the other pass. For example, the c-2,2-2,2 cluster is formed when the two
error-pairs ([al,a2], [bl,b2]) of the first pass swap partners and forms another two error-
pairs ([al,bl], [a2,b2]) of the second pass.
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Table 6: Residue BER due to error-pair sticking. For n = 10k, input BER = 15%, k\ = 5
and k2= 10.
X Px Ps Pr 2pxpspr/k2
2 0.115 0.0015 1 3.46E-05
3 0.022 0.0045 1/3 6.62E-06
4 2.8E-03 0.0090 1 4.98E-06
5 2.4E-04 0.0150 3/5 4.28E-07
BER due to error-pair 4.67E-05
Figure 6: The type of error-clusters that can be formed from the first two passes. Each
row represents the hidden error bits in a block. Notice that none of the hidden error-pairs
of the second pass is also an error-pair from the first pass.
1st pass
2nd pass
1st pass
2nd pass
c-2,2-2,2
al a2
bl b2
al bl
a2 b2
c-4,2-4,2
al a2
bl b2
cl c2
dl d2
al bl
a2 cl
b2 dl
c2 d2
c-2,4-4,2
al a2 a3 a4
bl b2 b3 b4
c-4,2-2,4
al a2
bl b2
cl c2
dl d2
al bl
a2 b2
a3 b3
a4 b4
al bl cl dl
a2 b2 c2 d2
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For counter examples, c-2,2-1,4, c- 1,4-2,2, and c-2,4-2,4 are forbidden. However,
c-2,2; 1,4-4,2 is a legal hidden error-clusters (i.e. two hidden error-pairs and one four-
hidden-errors block from the first pass).
2.2.3.2 cluster formation after two passes (small initial block size)
After eliminating error-pair sticking, the error cluster is the only way that error bits are
left undetected after the CASCADE procedure. A formula for the probability of error-
cluster formation is the ultimate definition of the reliability ofQKD. However, the
various types of legal clusters are too numerous. To simplify this problem, again, I will
limit to the small initial block size *i. In our example, there are 2000 blocks from the first
pass. Out of 2000 blocks, there are 2000*[flm(2,5,0.15) + 5m(3,5,0.15)] ~ 325 blocks
with two hidden errors and there are 2000*[Bm(4,5,0.15) + flm(4,5,0.15)] ~ 4.5 blocks
with four hidden errors. Therefore, ignoring the probability of having four hidden errors
in a block in our example introduces only a small error.
Recall that the number of hidden errors for the first two rounds are hi (= pxn) and h2
(= p2n) respectively. Therefore, a hidden error bit from the first pass will have a
probability p2lpi to remain undetected after the second round. Now the probability of
cluster formation is simplified to the problem of how to permute these p2n bits to obtain a
specific error-cluster pattern.
Cluster-2.2-2.2
The probability of forming cluster-2,2-2,2 can be viewed as two hidden error-pairs
[al,a2] and [bl,b2] from the first pass swap partners and form two hidden error-pairs
[al,bl] and [a2,b2] of the second pass (Fig. 6). As there arep2n/2 hidden error-pairs after
the second round, there are p2nl2 ways to choose the first error-pair and named this pair
as [al,bl]. The probability that both a2 and b2 (hidden error-pair partners from the first
pass) escape the detection from the BINARY of the second pass is (p2lpi)2. Now we need
the probability of a.2 and b2 forming a hidden error-pair. Let's choose the location of a.2
first (the order of choosing a2 or b2 first does not change the probability). There is no
constraint as a2's can be in any of the p2nl2-l error-pairs in pass two. The probability of
b2 being in the same error-pair with a.2 is l/(p2n-3). But we also double count in the first
choice of [al,bl] pair (that is, we could have chosen [a2,b2] instead). We also need to
convert the probability of cluster formation to the probability to BER by a factor Mn. So
the BER due to the formation of c-2,2-2,2 is:
P(c-2,2-2,2) = p2n/2*(p2/pi)2*(l/(p2n-3))*(4/nm/2)
Cluster-3.2-3.2
Similar to the calculation of cluster-2,2-2,2, starting from choosing an error-pair ([al,bl])
fromp2n/2 error-pairs. Again, the probability that both a2 and b2 remain undetected after
BINARY of the second pass is (p2lp\f. Now, a2 and b2 have to be in separate error-pairs
of the second pass (otherwise it would produce Cluster-2,2-2,2). Let the error-pair partner
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of the second pass for a.2 be cl. The probability that c2, the error-pair partners of cl from
the first pass, remains undetected after BINARY of the second pass is (p2/pi). The
probability of c2 forming an error-pair of the second pass with b2 is V(p2n-5). But we
also triple count in the first choice of [al,bl] pair (that is, we could have chosen [a2,cl]
or [b2,c2] instead). We also need to convert the probability to BER by a factor din. So
the BER due to the formation of cluster-6 is:
P(c-3,2-3,2) = p2n/2*(p2/Pl?*(l/(p2n-5))*(6/n)*(V2)
Cluster-4.2-4.2
Starting by choosing [al,bl] pair fromp2n/2 error-pairs, with the probability (p2lpif that
a2 and b2 remain undetected after BINARY of the second pass. a2 and b2 have to be in
separate hidden error-pairs of the second pass and let their error-pair partners be cl and
dl (i.e. their error-pair partners cannot be an error-pair from the first pass, otherwise,
c-3,2-3,2 is formed). The probability that both c2 and d2 remain undetected after
BINARY of the second pass is (p2/pi)2. And the probability that c2 is in the same
error-pair of the second pass with d2 is ll[p2n-l). But we also quadruple count in the first
choice of [al,bl] pair. We also need to convert the probability to BER by a factor 8/n. So
the BER due to the formation of cluster-8 is:
P(c-4,2-4,2) = p2n/2*(pyp04*(l/(p2n-7))*(8/n)*(l/4)
The formula may be generalized to (with the above assumptions):
^ 1
[k2/2
p2 = p2* X
y=2
Pi
P\ p2n-2y+ l
(21)
For our example, p = 0.15, h = 5,k2= 10, n = 10000; px = 0.0668, p2 = 0.0287, pm = 668
and p2n = 287, the probabilities of various type of clusters are shown in the third column
ofTable 7, corresponding to p2 = 3.18E-5. This value compares well with the value
derived from CASCADE tracking (3.3E-5, Table 5). I also ran simulation and obtained
p2 < 4.4E-5 using a better, but not perfect, interleaver. This interleaver is by doing
randomization twice. The blocks of the second pass are constructed using the random
interleaver like in the BS reconciliation procedure; after that, all blocks that contain pairs
of bits from the same blocks of the first pass are found and these blocks are mixed and
randomized again. Therefore, this interleaver reduces, but does not eliminate, the
probability of error-pair sticking. Notice also that p2 is approximately inversely
proportional to the input size n (the last term in equation (21)) which was also confirmed
by simulation.
In summary, the calculation of cluster formation probability demonstrates the importance
of interleaver design. The close agreement among the probability of error-cluster
formation, the BER from CASCADE tracking, and the BER from simulation demonstrate
the analytical approaches to derive the reliability ofQKD.
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2.2.3.3 interleaver design and the minimum distance of a pair of bits
In this work, I did not find or implement a "perfect" interleaver. A series of questions
about a perfect interleaver are still open. (How perfect is "perfect"? Is it actually
possible? How to construct it?) In this section, 111 venture for a definition of a
"perfect"
interleaver.
The task is to construct Kx at the beginning of the ith pass. That is, to divide the n bits into
\nlk\~\ blocks most efficiently using information ofKu ..., K{.\, where set Ky = {Ky,u ...,
Kyj, . . . } is all blocks of the yth pass (l<y<i) after i-l passes. Some Ky/s are smaller
than ky because BINARY breaks up some blocks into smaller blocks.
The first level ofmeaning for a perfect interleaver is that this interleaver will eliminate
the possibility of an error-pair from any earlier pass to be placed at the same block of the
current pass. For two passes, it means that any pair of bits [x,y] in any block t of the
second pass (K2,t) cannot belong to any block s of the first pass (^i,s). This is represented
by the following equation:
Vs,t (V[x,y]eK2tt => [x,y]eKu)
Or, equivalently
\/s,t fc[x,y]eKls => [x,y]KXt)
(22)
(23)
For the third pass, it means that any pair of bits [x,y] in any block u of the third pass
cannot belong to any block t of the second pass nor belong to any block s of the first pass.
This is represented by the following equation.
\fs,t,u (V[x,y]e K3m => [x,y]i KXt D [x,y]eKu J (24)
Or, equivalently
Vs,r,w ([x,y]GK2j\J [x,y]sKu V[x,y]K3,u (25)
Table 7: Probability of error-cluster formation after two or three passes for the example
case. (From equations (21) and (27)).
clusters after 2 passes clusters after 3 passes
y name prob. name prob.
2 c-2,2-2,2 1.87E-05 c-2,2-2,2-2,2 6.75E-11
3 c-3,2-3,2 8.09E-06 c-3,2-3,2-3,2 2.22E-13
4 c-4,2-4,2 3.50E-06 c-4,2-4,2-4,2 -2E-15
5 c-5,2-5,2 1.52E-06 c-5,2-5,2-5,2 -2E-17
total = 3.18E-05 total = 6.77E-11
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With an interleaver satisfying properties (22) and (24), some types of still possible hidden
error-clusters after three passes are shown in Fig. 7. Notice that the error
bits'
swapping
from the first two passes is the same as clusters shown in Fig. 6, despite that the hidden
error-pairs for the second pass are labeled differently. The hidden error-pairs of the third
pass are obtained by swapping error-pairs again. For c-2,2-2,2-2,2, there is only one legal
error-cluster of the third pass. For c-3,2-3,2-3,2, there are four legal clusters. For
c-4,2-4,2-4,2, there are many legal clusters (not all of them shown here). The upper-left
cluster is the base cluster for each error-cluster type. Other clusters are variations from
the base cluster (the error-bits swapping shown in boldface).
The distance of a pair of bits is defined as one if they are in the same block and as infinity
if they are not in the same block. Consider only one pass, any pair of bits has either
distance of one or distance of infinity. Consider more than two passes, any pair of bits is
directly related (in the same block in any of the passes), indirectly related (share a partner
or partner of partner and so on), or unrelated (distance of infinity). The last case is a
symptom of bad interleaver design so I will not consider that any further. If a pair of bits
have a common partner then the distance is defined as two, as two blocks are needed to
find their relationship. The number of blocks needed to establish the relationship of a pair
of bits is defined as the distance of these two bits. Some of distance examples can be
found in Fig. 7. The construction of a "perfect" interleaver takes into account of the pair-
wise distance information. The minimum distance of a block of the ith pass is the
minimum distance of any pair of bits within this block, utilizing the block structure
information from all previous passes (Ki, ..., Ki.{).
For example, refer to Fig. 7, all the error-pairs of the second pass have distance of
infinity as the distance of one is excluded by (22). The distances of error-pairs of the
third pass are derived from the block structure of the first two passes. The distance of an
error-pair al-b2 from the base cluster of c-2,2-2,2-2,2 is two because al-a.2 are in the
same block of pass one and a2-b2 are in the same block of pass two. The shorthand
notation, such as al-a2-b2, is shown below the minimum distance for each cluster in
Fig. 7, indicates how the minimum distance is derived.
A stronger requirement for a perfect interleaver is, in addition to the above, that it also
eliminates the possibility of error-pairs swapping partner the second time. This rule will
eliminate the formation of cluster with D = 2 (like c-2,2-2,2-2,2 in Fig. 7). This means
that any pair of bits [x,y] in any block i of the third pass can not share the same partner at
the previous two passes. This is represented by the following property:
\/s,t,u {[x,y]GK2ttr\[y,z]eKu^[x,z]K^u ) (26)
The concept of distance is not new. The interleaver design for turbo-code (see discussion
on page 37) uses similar concept of weight distribution [DD].
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2.2.3.4 cluster formation after three passes (small initial block size)
The simplest way for two error-pairs to remain undetected after three passes is to swap
partners for the second time at the third pass, as shown in Fig. 7. The probability of
cluster formation after two passes is already derived in Table 7. Ill extend the calculation
of probability to the cluster formation after three passes. In section 2.2.3.2, the
probability of cluster formation is calculated from the probability of hidden error bits
surviving the round two. In this section, I start from some error-cluster patterns after pass
two and calculate the probability of these error-pairs swap partners again.
Cluster-2.2-2.2-2.2
Consider the simplest error-cluster of two error-pairs, c-2,2-2,2-2,2 shown in Fig. 7.
According to property (22), error bits al and a2 have to be positioned in two separate
blocks of the third pass. There is no other restriction for the positions of al and a.2. Error
bit b2 has to be in the same block with al and the error bit bl has to be in the same block
with a.2 (according to property (24)) to make c-2,2-2,2-2,2. The probability of positioning
b2 in the same block with al is (&3-l)/(n-3-l); there are n-k3-l positions that b2 can be in
(one row occupies by [a2,bl], or k?, positions, is not allowed), and only h-l of these will
produce the hidden error-pair. Likewise, the probability of positioning bl in the same
block with a.2 is also (&3-l)/(n-3-l). Therefore,
P(c-2,2-2,2-2,2) = P(c-2,2-2,2)*[0fc3-l)/(n-A:3-l)]2
Cluster-3.2-3.2-3.2
The probability of forming one of the three error-pairs is (3_l)/(n-23-l), except now
there are two rows that the second error bit is forbidden. The probability of swapping
partners among these three error-pairs and forming one of the c-3,2-3,2-3,2 in Fig. 7 is:
P(c-3,2-3,2)*[(^3-l)/(n-2fe-l)]3
There are four clusters for c-3,2-3,2-3,2 as shown in Fig. 7. Let me define a function C, as
function of y, where y = 2,3,4.... (2) = 1 and C(3) = 4. For y = 4 or larger, t,(y) has some
large values. Therefore,
P(c-3,2-3,2-3,2) =
#3)*P(c-3,2-3,2))*[(3-l)/(n-23-l)]3
Cluster-4.2-4.2-4.2
Similarly:
P(c-4,2-4,2-4,2) =
#4)*P(c-4,2-4,2)*[(fe-l)/(-33-l)]4
Using equation (21), the generalized formula can be written as:
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Figure 7: Some error-clusters, using an interleaver defined by condition (22) and (24),
that can be formed after three passes. Each row represents the hidden error-pairs in a
block in each pass. Each cluster from the third pass is labeled with the minimum distance
of the cluster (see definition in text) and how the minimum weight is obtained. Condition
(22) and (24) eliminate the possibility of cluster of the third pass with minimum distance
D=\.
c-2,2-2,2-2,2 c-3 ,2-3,2-3,2 ! c-4Mk2-4,2
1st pass al a2 al a2 al a2
bl b2 bl b2 bl b2
cl c2 cl c2
dl d2
2nd pass al bl al b2 al b2
a2 b2 bl c2 bl c2
cl a2 1_ d2
dl a2
3rd pass al b2 al c2 al c2 al c2 al c2
a2 bl bl a2 bl cl bl d2 bl d2
D = 2 cl b2 a2 b2 cl a2 cl dl
al-a2-b2
al-
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[k2l2\
P3 = P2* 1
y=2
P2
P\
'r-m. ,* fe-i)y (27)
The probabilities of various clusters after three passes are shown in the last column of
Table 7 and the output BER ( p'3 ) after three passes will be about 6.75E-1 1. Notice that
the probability of forming c-3,2-3,2-3,2 is much lower than the probability of forming
c-2,2-2,2-2,2, in contrast to the smaller difference between c-3,2-3,2 and c-2,2-2,2. By
using an interleaver that obeys property (26), ft will be (2.22E-13)/4 = 5.55E-14.
However, I am not sure an interleaver obeying equation (22), (24), and (26) is achievable.
Some thoughts on whether an interleaver design is achievable or not are included in
Appendix.
The value for ft (6.75E-1 1) is drastically lower than the BER given by [BS] (1.7E-2) or
by [BBBSS]
(10"
)). This value is so low that using simulation to obtain BER estimate is
not a good idea. Unfortunately, there is no independent verification of the accuracy of
equation (27).
For better throughput, my analysis calls for a larger initial block size. The residue BER
calculation has to take into account multiple error-pairs in a block, which needs future
work to extend the above derivations.
2.3 Improvement of Reconciliation Procedure
To summarize the above observations, there are several ways to improve the BS
reconciliation procedure in terms of less information leakage and lower output BER.
Improvement ideas:
1) Larger initial block size to increase throughput.
2) Better choice of interleaver, instead of randomization, to avoid or reduce error-pair
sticking. This also eliminates the need of the fourth pass.
3) Some bits are already leaked or known to Eve in an earlier pass. There is no need to
carry these bits to the later pass.
Most of the improvement in throughput comes from the selection of the initial block size
(this work is done at the same block size schedule as in [BS], i.e., doubling block size
after each pass). The upper half ofTable 8 shows that throughput increases as k\
increases (at the end of the third pass). The throughput tends to level off at large block
size. Similar trend is observed for my improved procedure (the bottom half ofTable 8).
By removing the leaked bits from the later passes, a small gain in throughput is realized.
This can be seen by comparing the top and bottom half ofTable 8 at the same initial
block size. At k\ = 5, there is 3% gain in throughput; at 16 < kx < 64, the gain is 1%.
Because of error-pair sticking problem, the BS procedure shows significant residue BER
at ki = 32 and even more at ki = 64 (upper half ofTable 8). By using a better interleaver,
35
the error-pair sticking problem is eliminated at ki = 32 (bottom half of Table 8).
However, the residue error pattern becomes a cluster of some kind at ki = 64. By using
larger block size, such residue error-cluster disappeared from the few runs of simulation
(it is removed or reduced). The error-cluster problem may be due to the imperfect
interleaver used in this work. More elaborate interleaver design may help eliminate such
problem.
The implementation of interleaver is tricky. It is easy to fall into the trap of laying bits in
a three dimensional array of ki*k2*k3 and taking the parity of the rows as the first pass,
taking the parity of the columns as the second pass, and taking the parity of the third
(depth) dimension as third pass. This is indeed easy to implement and faster in
computation. However, this effectively reduces the input size of the problem from n to
size of the array ki*k2*k3. (n is much larger than k!*k2*k3). As probabilities of forming
various types of clusters are inversely proportional to input size, such implementation
may actually increase the residue BER.
I also varied the initial block size from 5 to 32 in order to see whether the block size
being power of two may perform better. The result seems to be monotonically increasing.
Therefore, it is inconclusive whether the block size of power of two would do any good. I
also tried the equal block size for all three passes and found the effect is also small, again
inconclusive. Employing equal block size takes more CPU time. Therefore, I kept the
block size schedule of doubling block size after each pass.
Table 8: Increasing initial block size of the BS procedure will improve the throughput
significantly. The error-pair sticking is evident. By taking out the randomization
procedure and removing leaked bits to the next pass increases throughput slightly. Yet,
cluster formation is now a problem. Larger block size can be used when there is a larger
batch of input bits.
BS procedure with varying block size, after the third pass, p = 0.15.
kl n #runs % bits left BER # of error left
5 10k 220 26.3% 0 0
16 10k 176 32.5% 0 0
32 10k 155 32.8% 2.5E-06 2 runs with 1 error-pair
64 10k 85 33.0% 1.2E-05 5 runs with 1 error-pair
Improved reconciliation: w/o randomization and reduced carry-over.
kl n #runs % bits left BER # of error left
5 10k 100 29.2% 0 0
16 10k 100 33.4% 0 0
32 10k 100 33.7% 0 0
64 10k 100 33.6% 2.8E-05 7 runs with cluster-4
64 10k 100 33.5% 1.4E-05 1 cluster-4 1 cluster- 10
64 50k 100 33.9% 0 0
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3 Discussion
There are four major areas that could further improve my current implementation or
analysis: (given a set of input parameters (n, p, k,, k2, and k3)).
1) Calculate the probability of hidden error-cluster formation after three passes by
including the possibility of having more than four errors in a block. This is the
ultimate analysis of reliability of the reconciliation procedure.
2) Answer the issues about the "perfect" interleaver. Whether it is possible? If so, how?
If not, what is the lowest level of error-pair sticking?
3) Find the maximum initial block size given an aim output BER.
4) Find the optimal block size schedule has not been thoroughly examined.
One conclusion from this work is that the number of simulation runs needed to establish a
good output BER estimate is impossibly huge. This is because the output BER is so low,
a reliable estimate would require billions of runs. In addition, the output BER depends on
the input batch size, which make the experimental space huge. Two approaches I outlined
previously in calculating the probability of cluster formation and the method of
CASCADE tracking, the latter I stopped at the second pass. These calculations so far are
restricted to a small initial block size. Such calculation needs to be expanded and
consider the possibility of more than four errors in a block. For the throughput issue of
CASCADE tracking method, there is also a need to find a formula for number of parity
checks needed to detect multiple error bits in a block. The optimal initial block size and
block size schedule could be achievable after this formula is obtained.
There are some possibilities that may further improve the reconciliation throughput.
Figure 8 illustrates a basic analysis of parity checks and the BINARY routine on blocks
(size ki = 8 and/? = 0.15). A block without parity error (between Alice and Bob) will not
go through BINARY and output BER pi = 9.11% (from equation (3)). A block with
parity error will go through BINARY routine that will divide this block into blocks of
smaller size. In this example (kx = 8), a block is divided into a block size of four, a block
size of two, and two blocks of size one. After BINARY, the BER for the bits in block
size of four is 5.5%, for block size of two is 2.25%, and for block size of one is 0%
(totally reliable). There is one bit marked (gray cells in Fig. 8) in each block that will be
discarded at the end of reconciliation. In the BS procedure, all these bits are carried to the
second pass and all are treated equally. Mixing bits with different BER is a lossy process.
There is definitely no point in carrying the bits from block size of one to the next pass, as
they are already known to eve. This idea is already implemented in this work. One way to
further increase throughput is to place bits with high BER in smaller blocks and bits with
low BER in larger blocks.
Another way to improve throughput is to treat the marked bit differently. In this view, the
white cells in Fig. 8 will be collected and interleaved to blocks of the second pass;
BINARY and CASCADE will be done on these cells first. Depending on the number of
errors found at this stage, the block size for the gray cells (marked bits) is then decided.
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For example, during the BINARY routine of the white cells some errors bits are found to
be coming from block size of two. Clearly the marked bit for that block is also an error
bit. There is no need to carry that bit into the second pass of gray cells.
Finally, it is interesting to note that utilizing multi-dimensional parity checks is not new.
The "product code", or two-dimensional parity check, was proposed by P. Elias in 1954
[E]. However, the revolutionary development of "turbo-code" started at the same time of
BS procedure was developed (in 1993). Turbo-code is basically a convolution encoder
that encodes parity checks twice, once without bits interleaving and once with bits
interleaving. At the decoder end, an iterative decoding process significantly reduces the
residue error rate. This iterative decoding processing in the turbo-code is similar to
CASCADE in reconciliation procedure. The interleaver design may influence the output
BER significantly. Currently, random permutation is typically employed in turbo-code
mostly because the
"optimal" interleaver is difficult to find except for a few simple cases
[DP], and difference between random interleaver and the "optimal" interleaver tend to be
small. The search for the two "optimal" interleavers for a turbo-code that encodes parities
thrice is an even more difficult problem. Therefore, the analyses of "optimal" interleaver
for turbo-code and for reconciliation procedure share similar difficulties.
Figure 8: The error rate of a bit after a parity check differs, depending on the block size
for that bit.
block size = 8 :
BER = 9.11%
r parity check OK
parity error and BINARY search
J
block size = 2:
BER = 2.25%
"Y~
block size = 4 :
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4 Conclusions
Improvement of reconciliation procedure for QKD is established. The improvement in
throughput is significant at high input BER. The major part of this improvement is due to
more accurate residue error rate estimation, which leads to the selection of a larger initial
block size. The minor contributions were obtained from using better interleaving strategy
(instead randomization) and avoiding carrying to the next pass bits that are already lost.
Only three passes are needed when a better interleaver is used.
The reliability of the key generated from QKD is also enhanced. More accurate residue
error rate estimation is found. The current analysis shows drastically much lower residue
error rate than the level given in [BS] or in [BBBSS]. The residue BER is lower with
larger input batch size and smaller initial block size. As smaller initial block size also
means lower throughput, the optimal initial block size should be chosen from the
co-optimization of the throughput and the residue BER. However, in most situations, the
throughput gain levels off at certain block size. Therefore, conservative choice of initial
block size will ensure that the residue BER is low.
Further improvement of current work is needed in the search an optimal interleaver
design, the initial block size selection rule, to analyze the probability of cluster formation
when initial block size is large, and to figure out the number of parity checks needed to
detect multiple error bits within a block. A few other ideas to further increase the
throughput are also addressed. At last, similarity between CASCADE and the iterative
decoding of "turbo
code"in error control coding is noted.
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6 Appendix
The design of interleaver remains to be a challenge. An easier question is whether there is
a possibility to achieve that when given a set of input parameters (, k\, k2, and 3). While
I cannot answer that question directly, the following formula may provide a bit of insight.
Formula (28) is the probability that a randomly selected block happens to be a "perfect
interleaver". For the second pass, one needs to select 2bits. For a random interleaver, the
number of choices is n*(n-l)*(n-2)*(n-3) ...*(n-k2+l). For the perfect interleaver, the
number of choice is more limited: n*(n-ki)*(n-2ki)*(n-3ki)* *(n-(k2-l)*ki).
Therefore, the probability of accidentally getting a perfect interleaver at the second pass
is:
k2-\
n M**i)
=0
*2-l (28)
n (n-i)
i=0
Similarly, the probability of accidentally getting an interleaver at the third pass that
satisfies property (24) is:
*3-l
n (n-tHh+h-v)
i^Q_ (29)
/t3-l
I! (n-i)
i=Q
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